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ABSTRACT
While numerous digital signature schemes exist in the liter-
ature, most real-world system rely on RSA-based signature
schemes or on the digital signature algorithm (DSA), includ-
ing its elliptic curve cryptography variant ECDSA.
In this position paper we review a family of alternative
signature schemes, based on hash functions, and we make
the case for their application in Internet of Things (IoT)
settings. Hash-based signatures provide postquantum secu-
rity, and only make minimal security assumptions, in general
requiring only a secure cryptographic hash function. This
makes them extremely flexible, as they can be implemented
on top of any hash function that satisfies basic security prop-
erties. Hash-based signatures also feature numerous param-
eters defining aspects such as signing speed and key size, that
enable trade-offs in constrained environments. Simplicity of
implementation and customization make hash based signa-
tures an attractive candidate for the IoT ecosystem, which
is composed of a number of diverse, constrained devices.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Hash-based signatures are signature schemes that rely ex-
clusively on the security of hash functions, and were first
introduced by Ralph Merkle in 1989 [15]. In recent years,
hash-based signatures have increased in popularity, and have
undergone numerous improvements [4]. In particular, mod-
ern schemes improve parameter sizes and runtimes for imple-
mentations, present security reductions, and lower the secu-
rity assumptions on the underlying hash function, including
resilience against collisions. There are several arguments
that support the use of hash-based signatures: minimal se-
curity assumptions and resistance to quantum computers,
simplicity of implementation, and extensive parameteriza-
tion leading to almost complete customization. In this pa-
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per, we argument that these same characteristic also make
them ideal candidates for the Internet of Things (IoT).
A first fundamental feature of hash modern hash-based
signature schemes is to make make minimal security assump-
tions, thus reducing the attack surface and opportunities
for cryptanalysis. The Extended Merkle Signature Scheme
(XMSS), for instance, relies exclusively on the underlying
hash function for security: it has been proven that if any
secure hash function exists, then a secure implementation of
XMSS is possible [3]. In practice, XMSS requires only a se-
cure cryptographic hash function that is either second preim-
age resistant or pseudorandom to be secure. This effectively
reduces the complexity of implementation, by eliminating
reliance on multiple security components, and streamlines
deployment among diverse implementations and devices, as
it is often the case in IoT devices.
Hash-based signature schemes are also function-agnostic:
they can be built on top of any hash function that satis-
fies the security requirements [4]. This inherent flexibility of
hash-based signatures allows the selection of the most suit-
able function (in terms of efficiency) for each application
scenario, which is an asset in constrained IoT settings. The
same flexibility also makes them future-proof, as hash func-
tions can be simply replaced in any implementation when
vulnerabilities for the specific function emerge over time.
Future-proofness of hash-based signatures is further guar-
anteed by their quantum-resistant nature [5]. In practical
scenarios and real-world implementations, the most com-
mon digital signature schemes are currently RSA, DSA, and
ECDSA. The security of these schemes relies on trapdoor
one-way functions based on the hardness of factoring inte-
gers and computing discrete logarithms, respectively. How-
ever, as shown by Shor [17], it is likely these computational
problems will be solved by quantum computers in polyno-
mial time, thus breaking the security of the trapdoor one-
way functions. As functioning quantum computers may be
developed over the medium term, post-quantum signature
schemes are being investigated, and the Internet Engineer-
ing Task Force (IETF), the European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI), and the US National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) have all started the stan-
dardisation process for post-quantum cryptography. The
function-agnostic characteristic of hash-based signatures also
makes them suitable post-quantum candidates, as there are
known ways to construct efficient hash function families that
display the needed security properties (such as second preim-
age resistance or pseudorandomness) even in the presence of
quantum computers [3]. Internet of Things settings such as
industrial applications and city monitoring, where deploy-
ment of new devices is difficult, expensive and time con-
suming, can benefit from the long term security offered by
post-quantum cryptography.
Finally, hash-based signature implementations are highly
parameterized, contrary to most other signature schemes.
This is particularly true in schemes where multiple hash
trees are used (as discussed in Section 2). The signature
scheme parameters enable trade-offs between signing speed
and key size, which can be adapted to specific implemen-
tation requirements. Therefore, parameterized hash-based
signature schemes allow security in performance-constrained
environments, that are common in the Internet of Things.
Low-power and lightweight signatures can in fact be achieved
through the selection of appropriate parameters, rather than
dedicated schemes.
The minimal security assumptions, function independence,
long term security and parameterization discussed above
make hash based signatures an ideal candidate for imple-
mentation in several IoT scenarios. In the following, we
present current hash based signing schemes (Section 2), and
discuss the main challenges that need to be overcome be-
fore they can be adopted as the mainstream signing solution
(Section 3).
2. HASH-BASED SIGNATURES
The basic design idea of all hash-based signatures schemes
is to combine many one-time signature key pairs into a single
structure using a hash tree. Hash trees are a hierarchical
data structure that was proposed [14] and patented (in 1982)
by Merkle [13], sometimes referred to as “Merkle tree”. In a
hash tree, every leaf node is labelled with the hash of a data
block, and every non-leaf node is labelled with the hash of
the labels of its child nodes.
One-time signatures (OTS) are the basic building block
of hash-based digital signatures. One-time signatures were
proposed for the first time by Leslie Lamport in 1979 [10],
and derive their name from the property that each signature
key pair can be used only once. Most one-time signature
schemes rely on one-way functions, typically hash functions,
for their security. In this sense, one-time signature schemes
have similar characteristic to hash-based signature schemes.
For instance, the first such scheme, proposed by Lamport
in the same technical report [10], relies exclusively on the
security of the underlying hash function. In order to sign
a message with a Lamport signature, a hash of the mes-
sage is produced. Given a hash function with output length
k-bits, the private key consists of k pairs of random num-
bers of the same length, while the public key is the hash of
all the 2k numbers selected as private key. The message is
signed as follows: for each bit in the message hash, if the
bit is 0 we select the first number in the corresponding pair
in the private key, if the bit is 1 we select the second. The
resulting selection of k random number is the message signa-
ture, which can be verified by hashing the message, as well
as each number composing the signature, and comparing it
to the hash in the public key corresponding to the message
hash bit value. As evident, the entire construction is based
and relies on the chosen hash function. Notable examples of
one-time signature schemes also include Winternitz’s OTS
[2], or, more recently, W-OTS+ [7].
The single-use nature of one-time signature schemes makes
them impractical in real-world scenarios. Hash-based signa-
tures solve this issue by combining a large number of one-
time signature key pairs into a single structure, and con-
structing aggregated public and private keys from the one-
time key pairs. Ralph Merkle proposed the first such scheme
in 1989 [15], using a hash tree structure to combine the one-
time keys. The tree uses the same hash function used by the
OTS. The node at the top of the tree acts as a global public
key. To authenticate the relation of a one-time public key
to the global public key, signatures store an authentication
path, which is the sequence of tree nodes from the one-time
public key to the tree’s top. The global private key can be
constructed in a number of ways. A simple solution could be
to concatenate all one-time private keys, but this would re-
sult in either a reduced number of OTS key pairs, or a very
large global private key. More efficiently, a deterministic
pseudorandom number generator (PNRG) can be used, fol-
lowing Winternitz’s W-OTS construction [7]. Starting from
an initial seed value, which acts as private key, both suc-
cessive seeds and one-time secret keys are derived in a chain
through the PRNG. This construction also provides forward
secrecy, but the chain structure is inherently stateful (see
Section 3). A scheme provides forward secrecy if an attacker
cannot learn information about formerly used signature keys
by getting hold of the current private key. Forward secrecy
can be an important feature in a Internet of Things, in par-
ticular in setting where devices can be stolen, compromised
or tampered with. This is a more prominent risk in urban or
outdoor scenarios, where the physical security of the device
cannot be guaranteed.
An efficiency limitation of the original Merkle construction
is related to the hash tree height. In general, the tree must
have height n in order to generate 2n OTS. Multi Tree XMSS
(styled by the authors XMSSMT ) [9], an improvement over
the Extended Merkle Signature Scheme by Buchmann et
al. [3], solved this issue by using multiple tree layers, that
allow combining large numbers of OTS key pairs into a single
structure.
The post-quantum security of hash-based signatures pro-
moted research into practical schemes and their implemen-
tation. The proposed implementations have also been eval-
uated against side channel attacks. In particular, hash-
based signatures schemes have vulnerabilities against hard-
ware fault attacks, both in the case of natural and malicious
faults. In [16], Mozaffari-Kermani et al. assess and bench-
mark constructions for stateless hash-based signatures on
application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC). Using novel
fault diagnosis methods, they propose an implementation
approach that makes such hash-based constructions more
reliable against natural faults, and helps protecting them
against malicious faults. Similarly to the signature schemes
they aim to protect, their approach is highly parameterized,
and can be tailored to the resources available and for differ-
ent reliability objectives.
On top of the main characteristics of hash-based signa-
tures we presented in the introduction, modern schemes add
several efficiency and security improvements such as forward
secrecy and fault-attack resistance. Mainly presented as a
solution to post-quantum security, we believe hash-based
signatures have now reached the necessary maturity to be
used in real-world applications, and in particular in a setting
where their features are most useful, such as the diverse In-
ternet of Things ecosystem. In the next section, we analyse
the few main remaining challenges to widespread adoption.
3. CHALLENGES
As highlighted by Denis Butin in the article Hash-Based
Signatures: State of Play [4], a number of challenges must be
overcome before hash-based signatures can find widespread
application. Butin mentions, in particular, the issues of
statefulness and standardization, which are both relevant to
the Internet of Things setting. In the following, we discuss
progress on these topics by the cryptographic community.
Statefulness derives from the use of one-time signature
key pairs. As security depends on the single, non-repeated
use of each one-time key, tracking which one-time signing
pairs have already been used is crucial. If one-time sign-
ing keys are used sequentially, an index and counter value
must be stored in the global secret key to indicate the or-
der in which keys can be used. Size requirements for the
index depend on the tree structure, however they can be
as little as 4-bytes in XMSS case [3]. The issue of state
management has been recently addressed by McGrew et al.
[12], who propose a hybrid stateless/stateful scheme. State-
less hash-based signature schemes have also been proposed,
most notably SPHINCS by Bernstein et al. [1], and its vari-
ant SPHINCS-Simpira [6]. While such schemes were known
to be possible in theory, SPHINCS was the first practical
stateless scheme, achieving the level of efficiency needed for
actual implementation. SPHINCS can sign hundreds of mes-
sages per second on a modern CPU, using parameters that
provide 2128 security against quantum attacks. The figure
was further improved by the optimized variant SPHINCS-
Simpira.
Standardization of hash-based signatures by a recognized
body such as NIST would also be beneficial to their adop-
tion. In general, standardized schemes enjoy broader adop-
tion; and the additional scrutiny of the schemes during the
standardization process reinforces confidence in the security
of the scheme. Hash based functions are currently being con-
sidered by governmental and international bodies. In par-
ticular, IETF is considering both XMSS and the Leighton-
Micali schemes for standardization [11, 8].
Butin also argues that the numerous parameters that char-
acterize hash-based signature schemes opens the way for in-
secure implementation choices by non-experts in the absence
of guidelines. While we agree that recommended parameters
should be provided by the cryptographic community, we also
believe that the ability to customize signing speed and key
size depending on the application scenario is a crucial asset.
The flexibility and potential for case-by-case trade-offs will
open the way to application in the diverse and constrained
reality of the vast majority of IoT devices.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this position paper is to make the case for
wider deployment of hash-based signatures in the Internet
of Things. We believe that the simplicity of hash-based
signature schemes, which are built and rely only on hash
functions, streamlines implementation in an environment
as diverse as IoT. The high level of customization and pa-
rameterization featured by hash-based signatures also fa-
cilitates deployment on resource constrained devices. Fi-
nally, hash-based signatures are future proof, thanks to their
hash function-agnostic nature and quantum computing re-
sistance.
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